Pemikiran Kebangsaan

By: Bangkit Rahmat Tri Widodo

A remarkable transformation has marked the Indonesian democratic journey since the fall of Suharto in 1998. Institutions of accountability, decentralized governance, electoral competition, and civil liberties have emerged as foundational pillars of the post-authoritarian polity. Yet beneath this democratic façade lies the persistent dominance of oligarchic structures, which are networks of elites whose control over wealth, political institutions, and the media has shaped the contours of power in the Republic (Winters, 2011; Robison & Hadiz, 2017). This oligarchic persistence represents not merely an economic concentration of resources but a profound distortion in the distribution of political influence, policy outcomes, and institutional integrity. As Indonesia seeks to chart its course toward 2045, the tension between democratic aspirations and oligarchic realities will largely determine the nation’s future trajectory.

Oligarchy in Indonesia has evolved rather than disappeared. The post-Soeharto reforms dismantled authoritarianism but simultaneously opened new arenas for elite competition, patronage, and rent-seeking (Aspinall & Mietzner, 2022). Economic liberalization, decentralization, and electoral politics have not diffused power evenly; instead, they have reconfigured elite networks into more complex forms of domination. The challenge Indonesia faces today is not the overt military authoritarianism of the past but a subtler, more entrenched alliance between wealth and political authority —a form of elite continuity that inhibits the maturation of democracy and constrains the pursuit of public welfare (Hadiz & Robison, 2010).

 

The Nature of Oligarchy in Post-Authoritarian Indonesia

Jeffrey Winters (2011) conceptualizes oligarchy as the rule of wealth, in which economic power translates into political power and sustains systemic inequality. Within Indonesia, oligarchy manifests as a hybrid configuration between formal democratic institutions and informal elite networks. The democratic procedures (elections, parties, legislatures, and courts) exist, but the substantive content of democracy is hollowed out by oligarchic capture (Aspinall, 2013). Wealthy patrons often control political parties, media conglomerates function as political instruments, and policy outcomes frequently reflect elite bargaining rather than popular deliberation.

The roots of Indonesia’s oligarchic order are both historical and structural. The legacy of the New Order’s bureaucratic capitalism provided the foundation for elite patronage and rent extraction (MacIntyre, 2001). During Suharto’s regime, economic development was orchestrated through a nexus of state, business, and military elites who shared rents from state monopolies and natural-resource concessions (Robison, 1986). When the regime collapsed, the oligarchic networks adapted. Rather than disappearing, they diffused into the new democratic institutions, ensuring that reform would not threaten the fundamental distribution of wealth and power. What emerged was a new political economy of democracy dominated by the same old elites, albeit under the language of electoral legitimacy (Hadiz & Robison, 2010).

The decentralization process after 2001, designed to empower regions, paradoxically reproduced oligarchic dynamics at the local level (Mietzner, 2015). Regional strongmen, family dynasties, and business groups captured sub-national institutions. In many provinces, gubernatorial and district elections became arenas for elite competition financed by corporate capital. The proliferation of local parties and business–political alliances entrenched a system of patronage that extended from Jakarta to the peripheries. Thus, oligarchy in Indonesia operates not only at the national center but also within the capillaries of regional power (Aspinall & Berenschot, 2019).

 

Oligarchy and Democratic Erosion

Democratic consolidation requires not only the institutionalization of elections but also the deepening of participation, accountability, and equality before the law. Oligarchic dominance undermines these pillars. When money and access define political success, the substantive meaning of representation is lost. Political parties cease to serve as vehicles of ideological competition and instead become instruments for the distribution of rents and the reproduction of elites (Slater, 2018). The costs of contestation —such as campaign financing, media exposure, and mobilization —create barriers that exclude ordinary citizens and perpetuate elite monopolies over decision-making.

The erosion of democratic quality in Indonesia is visible in the cartelization of political parties, the commodification of legislative seats, and the manipulation of policy processes (Ambardi, 2008). Elite collusion across party lines produces a semblance of political stability, yet it erodes accountability and opposition. This cartelized politics generates consensus among elites while marginalizing citizens. The state becomes the prize of private interests rather than the arena of public deliberation. Consequently, democracy becomes procedural rather than substantive, a form without content (Winters, 2013).

At the societal level, oligarchy engenders cynicism, apathy, and political disengagement. Citizens perceive politics as a contest among elites rather than a vehicle for collective progress. This perception erodes trust in institutions and weakens civic responsibility. Over time, oligarchic democracy risks transforming into an electoral autocracy, where elections legitimize elite rule without altering its foundations. The challenge for Indonesia, therefore, lies in transcending this structural constraint: building a democracy that redistributes political and economic power rather than merely rotating elite factions (Aspinall & Mietzner, 2022).

 

Civil–Military Relations and the Oligarchic Nexus

Indonesia’s political evolution cannot be understood without reference to its military. The Tentara Nasional Indonesia (TNI) has long embodied the ethos of guardianship, nationalism, and unity (Crouch, 2010). Its dual function during the New Order placed it at the heart of political administration and economic enterprise. The post-Reformasi reforms sought to separate the military from politics, establish civilian supremacy, and professionalize the force. Yet, oligarchic structures have subtly reconnected the military to elite networks, often through business interests, political patronage, or informal alliances.

Oligarchic power influences civil–military relations in several ways. Business elites often maintain security partnerships or rely on military and police networks to safeguard their economic activities, particularly in resource-rich regions. Retired officers increasingly enter politics or corporate boards, sustaining elite interdependence (Mietzner & Misol, 2020). Political elites may instrumentalize the military’s legitimacy for electoral or economic purposes, thereby blurring the boundary between professional service and political favor. These interactions create a feedback loop: oligarchic interests infiltrate security institutions, while segments of the security establishment find incentives to align with elite power for post-retirement opportunities or political advancement (Crouch, 2010).

The future of civilian control thus depends not merely on formal legal reforms but on the dismantling of oligarchic patronage that binds the military to political and economic elites. As long as oligarchic networks dominate state institutions, the military’s subordination to civilian authority remains contingent rather than consolidated. In this sense, the struggle for democratic civilian control is inseparable from the broader battle against oligarchy itself.

 

The Political Economy of Inequality

At the core of oligarchy lies economic inequality. The concentration of wealth among a narrow elite translates into structural inequality in opportunity, access, and influence. Indonesia’s rapid economic growth since the early 2000s has lifted millions out of poverty but has widened the gap between the ultra-rich and the rest of society (World Bank, 2023). Conglomerates dominate strategic sectors —specifically mining, banking, property, and media —while small and medium enterprises struggle for credit and protection. This dualistic economy produces a social order in which economic elites exercise veto power over redistributive policy, taxation, and regulation (Winters, 2011).

Economic inequality perpetuates political inequality. Campaigns are financed by wealthy donors expecting policy returns, while legislators dependent on private funding rarely advocate redistributive reform (Ford & Pepinsky, 2014). Clientelistic ties shape bureaucratic appointments and procurement contracts. As a result, the state’s developmental function becomes distorted: public goods are under-supplied, social protection remains inadequate, and corruption becomes systemic (Robison & Hadiz, 2017). Oligarchic domination transforms development into an extractive process rather than a distributive one.

The link between oligarchy and inequality extends beyond economics. It shapes the cultural imagination of citizenship and justice. When elites monopolize opportunity, meritocracy gives way to patrimonialism. Young Indonesians perceive advancement as dependent on connections rather than competence, eroding belief in the fairness of the system (Aspinall & Berenschot, 2019). Over time, such perceptions undermine national cohesion and social trust, which are two critical ingredients for long-term stability.

 

Regional Power and Local Dynasties

Indonesia’s decentralization was intended to democratize power, yet in many regions it has entrenched local dynasties. Governors, mayors, and district heads often emerge from powerful families or business networks and use state resources to consolidate their positions (Choi, 2018). Electoral competition narrows to elite factions, and public offices become vehicles for capital accumulation. This phenomenon of subnational oligarchy mirrors the national pattern: local powerholders reproduce the same logic of clientelism and patronage that characterizes Jakarta’s elite politics (Mietzner, 2015).

In resource-rich provinces such as East Kalimantan and Riau, oligarchic capture has facilitated rent extraction from mining, palm oil, and energy industries (Aspinall & van Klinken, 2011). Political leaders allied with business elites trade concessions for campaign support, while local communities face environmental degradation and social marginalization. This dynamic not only undermines local democracy but also contributes to regional inequality, threatening the unity of the archipelagic state. Oligarchy at the periphery thus reproduces the same structural asymmetries that define the center (Hadiz, 2010).

 

The Moral and Institutional Consequences

Oligarchic dominance corrodes both moral and institutional foundations of the Republic. It erodes the ideal of equality before the law, as elites often evade accountability through political protection or judicial manipulation (Butt, 2017). The perception that justice is selective diminishes public confidence in the rule of law. Institutions intended to safeguard integrity, such as anti-corruption agencies, electoral commissions, and courts, become vulnerable to political pressure or co-optation (Mietzner, 2020). The cycle of impunity perpetuates cynicism, disillusionment, and moral decay.

Culturally, oligarchy weakens the moral fabric of civic virtue. The ethos of service, merit, and solidarity that animated the early Republic gives way to pragmatism and transactionalism. Politics becomes a career of accumulation rather than sacrifice. The public sphere shrinks as citizens withdraw from political engagement, perceiving it as corrupt and inaccessible (Aspinall & Mietzner, 2022). This moral disengagement represents a deeper threat than institutional weakness: it undermines the collective spirit of the nation itself.

 

Oligarchy and the Future of Democratic Consolidation

The long-term future of Indonesia depends on whether its democracy can transcend oligarchic constraints. The coexistence of democratic institutions and oligarchic dominance creates a paradox: elections continue, freedoms are formally preserved, yet structural inequality limits genuine empowerment (Winters, 2011). This hybrid system risks stagnation, where reform is cosmetic and participation ritualistic. Unless reformed, Indonesia’s democracy may drift toward a low-accountability equilibrium —a stable but shallow democracy unable to deliver justice, innovation, or inclusion (Slater, 2018).

Democratic consolidation requires redistributing both political and economic power. Yet this task is complex. Oligarchic interests are embedded in state structures, party financing, and media ownership (Hadiz & Robison, 2010). Reform must therefore be systemic rather than piecemeal. Institutional strengthening, campaign finance transparency, anti-corruption enforcement, and public participation are necessary but insufficient unless accompanied by broader socio-economic transformation (Mietzner, 2020). Education, civic literacy, and the cultivation of ethical leadership are crucial to rebuilding the moral authority of public institutions.

For the military and broader state apparatus, consolidation implies renewed professionalism anchored in constitutional obedience rather than elite alignment. The concept of “defense by development” acquires relevance here: national security and social progress are inseparable. A professional, apolitical, and people-oriented military supports democracy not only through disengagement but also by embodying integrity, discipline, and service. The restoration of these civic virtues represents Indonesia’s best defense against both authoritarian relapse and oligarchic decay.

 

Reclaiming the Republic: Toward a Post-Oligarchic Vision

The struggle against oligarchy is ultimately a struggle to restore the Republic’s founding ideals: justice, unity, and the sovereignty of the people. This requires not merely technical reform but moral renewal. The Pancasila vision of social justice (Keadilan Sosial Bagi Seluruh Rakyat Indonesia) demands that economic and political power serve the collective good rather than private enrichment. To achieve this, Indonesia must foster a new generation of leaders and institutions guided by ethical commitment, meritocratic principles, and civic responsibility.

Reform must begin with transparency and education. A more informed citizenry is the best antidote to oligarchic manipulation. Digital literacy, investigative journalism, and civic awareness can expose networks of corruption and promote accountability (Ford & Pepinsky, 2014). Economic diversification and the empowerment of small and medium enterprises can weaken elite monopolies. Strengthening regional universities and local governance capacity can reduce dependency on centralized patronage. These structural reforms must be accompanied by cultural transformation, which is the internalization of integrity as a social norm rather than a rhetorical ideal.

The future of Indonesia will be determined by whether its elites choose adaptation or reform. If oligarchic networks continue to dominate, the Republic risks entrenching a stable but stagnant order, vulnerable to populist backlash and external pressure. If, however, elites evolve toward ethical stewardship, sharing power and wealth through transparent institutions, Indonesia can realize its potential as a resilient, prosperous, and democratic archipelagic nation.

 

Conclusion

The endurance of oligarchy in Indonesia constitutes both a structural and moral challenge to the nation’s democratic future. It permeates the political system, distorts economic justice, and undermines institutional integrity. Yet the existence of oligarchy does not preordain decline. History shows that societies can reform entrenched systems when moral conviction aligns with institutional courage. Indonesia’s post-Soeharto democracy remains young enough to learn, flexible enough to adapt, and dynamic enough to reform.

The essential task is to transform power from privilege into responsibility, and authority from domination into service. Only by reconciling democracy with equality, professionalism with morality, and statecraft with justice can Indonesia move beyond oligarchic stagnation toward genuine democratic consolidation. The Republic’s destiny lies not merely in the strength of its economy or its military, but in the integrity of its leadership and the courage of its citizens to defend the principle that sovereignty belongs to the people.

 

References

Ambardi, K. (2008). The making of the Indonesian multiparty system: A cartelized party system and its origin. Gadjah Mada University Press.

Aspinall, E. (2013). Popular agency and interests in Indonesia’s democratic politics. Indonesia, 96, 1–28.

Aspinall, E., & Berenschot, W. (2019). Democracy for sale: Elections, clientelism, and the state in Indonesia. Cornell University Press.

Aspinall, E., & Mietzner, M. (2022). Southeast Asia’s authoritarian turn revisited: Elite fragmentation and democratic decline in Indonesia. Journal of Contemporary Asia, 52(5), 710–728.

Aspinall, E., & van Klinken, G. (Eds.). (2011). The state and illegality in Indonesia. KITLV Press.

Butt, S. (2017). Corruption and law in Indonesia. Routledge.

Choi, N. (2018). Local politics in Indonesia: Pathways to power. Routledge.

Crouch, H. (2010). Political reform in Indonesia after Soeharto. ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute.

Ford, M., & Pepinsky, T. (Eds.). (2014). Beyond Oligarchy: Wealth, power, and contemporary Indonesian politics. Cornell University Press.

Hadiz, V. R. (2010). Localising power in post-authoritarian Indonesia: A Southeast Asia perspective. Stanford University Press.

Hadiz, V. R., & Robison, R. (2010). Reorganising power in Indonesia: The politics of oligarchy in an age of markets. Routledge.

MacIntyre, A. (2001). Institutions and investors: The politics of the economic crisis in Southeast Asia. Cornell University Press.

Mietzner, M. (2015). Reinventing Asian populism: Jokowi’s rise, democracy, and political contestation in Indonesia. Policy Studies, 72, 1–44.

Mietzner, M. (2020). Democracy in Indonesia: From stagnation to regression? ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute.

Mietzner, M., & Misol, E. (2020). Civil–military relations in Indonesia: Challenges of democratic control. Asian Security, 16(2), 156–178.

Robison, R. (1986). Indonesia: The rise of capital. Allen & Unwin.

Robison, R., & Hadiz, V. R. (2017). The political economy of oligarchy and the state in Indonesia. In Ford & Pepinsky (Eds.), Beyond oligarchy (pp. 35–60). Cornell University Press.

Slater, D. (2018). Ordering power: Contentious politics and authoritarian leviathans in Southeast Asia. Cambridge University Press.

Winters, J. A. (2011). Oligarchy. Cambridge University Press.

Winters, J. A. (2013). Oligarchy and democracy in Indonesia. Indonesia, 96, 11–33.

World Bank. (2023). Indonesia economic prospects 2023: Boosting inclusive growth. World Bank Publications